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To: Professor Ermanno Bencivenga, the Editor in Chief, Topoi 
Re: Philosophy: What is to be done? 
 
Dear Ermanno, 
Many thanks for inviting me to contribute an essay to the forthcoming 
issue of Topoi devoted to “Philosophy: What is to be done?”. Regrettably, I 
don’t think I have much to say on this topic, so I’m afraid I am going to have 
to decline. I hope you will accept my apologies. Indeed, the more I mull over 
it, the more I seem to find good reasons, besides my lack of imagination, why 
I could not in all honesty accept your invitation. 
I take it that you are not interested in a purely descriptive or predictive 
assessment of the prospects of philosophy. If you were, I am sure your list of 
invitees would not have been restricted to a few insiders. We might learn a lot 
from what others have to say about our work and about its place in our soci-
ety. In any event, on that score I would definitely have little to say to your 
readers. To me it just seems that philosophy is doing all right, and unless my 
sense of discernment is grossly mistaken, it also seems to me that things are 
going to be all right for a while. More than ever before, today philosophy in-
cludes a variety of methods and substantive positions that go beyond the spur 
of fashion and reach out beneficially into a number of neighboring disci-
plines. There are more philosophers and philosophy students today than ever 
before, more publications, more conferences, more opportunities for all of us 
to interact with the natural, the social, the cognitive scientists. Of course 
quantity is no measure of quality—and numbers may be misleading, too. But 
wouldn’t it be worse if the trend pointed in the opposite direction? 
I often hear people complain: Where are the Platos, the Descartes, the 
Kants, the Quines of contemporary philosophy? I don’t know where they are, 
or even whether there are any, but to me that doesn’t mean much and I don’t 
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see any point in speculating. As with other fields of study, it might even be a 
good thing if it turned out that the practice of philosophy no longer needs to 
depend on the leadership of a few luminaries. Of course I agree with your 
Leopardi here: “Knowledge is not like wealth, which may be divided or 
amassed together and always comes to the same sum.” But this is not to say 
that genuine progress requires the inventiveness of a few individual minds. It 
seems to me that a good team or community working together may contribute 
truly ground-breaking ideas, too, in philosophy as elsewhere. 
I often hear colleagues complain: We are just a bunch of professionals 
caught up in our academic rigmarole. We produce works of interest to nobody 
but one another, we are swamped with papers to finish, books to review, 
submissions to referee, tenure struggles, committees, reports, applications, 
deadlines of all sorts. I agree that there is a lot to feel frustrated about when it 
comes to our daily activities. But this is not something peculiar to philosophy, 
is it? This is what the life of scholars and scientists has become across the 
board and everybody has to come to terms with it, philosophers as much as 
historians or molecular biologists. If there is a problem with this state of af-
fairs, it is a problem for everyone and I am sorry to say I don’t have any big 
ideas to offer towards a general assessment, at least not in the form of a jour-
nal article. 
More importantly, I often hear people complain that philosophers have 
lost contact with the real world, their writings being disconcertingly remote 
from the grand old questions with which they are supposed to deal. “Philoso-
phy ain’t what it used to be.” But then, again, has it ever been? Already Aris-
tophanes accused Socrates of “hairsplitting twaddle”. And didn’t Justinian 
close the Academy because he thought that philosophy had turned into a ve-
hicle of pedantic subtleties? Didn’t Roger Bacon feel disgust from the quib-
bling casuistries of the Schoolmen, criticizing the philosophical methods of 
his days throughout his Compendium? Didn’t the young Schelling protest that 
philosophy as a whole had become “a business of the learned”, Mill that it 
was falling into distastefulness and disrepute because “great events had 
ceased to inspire great ideas”, Nietzsche that philosophy had degenerated into 
a “boring academic pursuit”, Dewey that it would recover itself only when it 
ceased to be “a device for dealing with the problems of philosophers” and be-
came “a method for dealing with the problems of men”? Surely philosophy 
and philosophers have always been in danger of getting lost in their own su-
perfluousness, and yet they have managed to produce good things, sometimes 
as a reaction to, sometimes as an implementation of that very seeming super-
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fluousness. The present-day picture doesn’t strike me as any worse than be-
fore. On the contrary, it seems to me that the sort of technicalities to which 
many contemporary philosophers direct their efforts are no more abstract or 
abstruse than those that paved the way of our discipline throughout the centu-
ries: it may not be clear to all why we need to philosophize about the meaning 
of proper names, the metaphysical status of finkish dispositions, or the possi-
bility of martian pain, and it would be good if once in a while we took stock 
and described the forest that lies behind these individual trees, but neither was 
it clear to our ancestors why philosophers would worry about the reality of 
haecceitates or fight over the number of angels that can dance on the head of 
a pin.  
But never mind all this. As I said, I take it that you are not especially in-
terested in the descriptive or predictive reading of your question. It is the 
normative reading that must interest you: not what is going on but what is to 
be done, literally. Also in this regard, however, I’m afraid that I would not 
have much to say.  
On the one hand, it seems to me that on this reading, your question calls 
primarily for a practical answer—I would even say a political answer. Surely 
one thing that must be done is to guarantee the survival of our discipline in 
the face of the budget cuts that threaten higher education world-wide. These 
are times when support and recognition go hand in hand with material suc-
cess, and it goes without saying that the humanities do not fare well on this 
score. However, precisely because of this, it seems to me that the issue goes 
far beyond philosophy and concerns the overall place of culture, education, 
and research in this society of ours. I guess I could write up something to in-
form your readers about how I feel concerning these important issues, as a 
citizen if not as a philosopher. But à quoi bon, Ermanno? I am sure the read-
ers of Topoi already share the same sort of concerns. I am sure they all agree 
that philosophy, if not the humanities at large, are as important as molecular 
biology or computer science. So, if indeed something is be done to secure the 
survival of our discipline along with all others—to make sure that the rather 
optimistic picture I mentioned above does not dissolve under the pressure of 
stubborn market-oriented policies—I honestly don’t think I can play Lenin 
with your readers and I would rather feel compelled to try and get my hands 
dirty in real politics. 
I understand you might disagree. Isn’t it precisely in this connection that 
it matters a lot how philosophy is perceived outside our small and self-
referential academic world? Isn’t it precisely in view of such general concerns 
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that we should do everything possible to dispel the impression of unenlighten-
ing superfluousness that our work might suggest? If so, then we should try to 
figure out some good strategies together before embarking in any sort of po-
litical action on its behalf, and what better opportunity than a whole journal 
issue devoted to this task? I do welcome this opportunity. I just cannot imag-
ine myself contributing anything more than a modest plea for intellectual 
honesty. Let’s not play any games and let’s not try to be smart when we are 
not; any other, more specific “strategy” would strike me as intolerable. For 
instance, one might think that we ought to make an effort to justify philosophy 
by re-directing our activities towards those problems that appear to be of 
greater practical concern, focusing on (say) applied ethics and political phi-
losophy rather than metaphysics or epistemology. I would oppose that. As 
much as I yearn for a world in which questions of great practical concern are 
center stage, and in which everybody has equal opportunities to address such 
questions and contribute to their solutions, I think we would betray our pro-
fession if we reconfigured its boundaries on such grounds. It is precisely by 
exposing the unexpected ramifications of our ethical and political beliefs, in-
cluding their metaphysical and epistemological ramifications, that philosophy 
can contribute something original, whatever it takes. (Sometimes it is also by 
drawing our attention to problems that are not of great practical concern—or 
not obviously so—that philosophy can contribute something truly destabiliz-
ing.) Alternatively, one might think that we ought to make an effort at least to 
explain what philosophy is about: by presenting it in more accessible fashion, 
by doing away with technicalities, by skipping the arguments and going 
straight to the conclusions. I would oppose that, too. As much as I yearn for a 
society in which everybody can enjoy the pleasure and the pain of philosophi-
cal practice, it seems to me that a good philosopher is not one who can sim-
plify what is complex, but one who can uncover the dazzling, extraordinary 
complexity that hides behind the simple things of everyday life, the intricate 
space of possibilities that lies beyond the given. Sometimes we can do that 
with our students, and to the extent that they learn not to take anything for 
granted and to be intellectually adventurous, to that extent we feel that we 
have managed to convey the right message. Surely we don’t want to adopt a 
different strategy when it comes to conveying the message to the rest of the 
world. We just have to do it. We just have to be good at our job. 
So, insofar as the question, What is to be done?, calls for a political an-
swer, I would have little to say besides the obvious. On the other hand, per-
haps you are interested in a truly philosophical answer? Not what is to be 
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done for philosophy, but in philosophy? If so, then I would have to confess a 
certain embarrassment. For it seems to me that any such answer would be at 
odds with the general conception of philosophy that inspired Topoi through-
out these years and that I deeply share—a conception of philosophy that dis-
dains any ideology and abstains from any rigid guidelines, and that favors the 
possible over the necessary, the practice over the doctrine, the example over 
the commandment. Of course, philosophically I have my wishes. For exam-
ple, I wish the linguistic turn were finally over. I wish we stopped doing 
metaphysics as though the character of reality could be read off our represen-
tations of it. I wish that research in logic freed itself from the system impris-
onment that characterized its development over the last decades. I wish that 
my favorite views on a number of specific topics—that constitution is iden-
tity, that there is no worldly indeterminacy, that we are liable for what we do 
even if we couldn’t do otherwise, and so on and so forth—were taken more 
seriously than their competitors. But these wishes are the sort of thing that 
inspire my daily practice as a philosopher. Part of my job, as I understand it, 
is precisely to try and get clear about such matters, sharing with others the 
reasons and arguments that I find most compelling, or the doubts and worries 
that I find most disturbing. The wish list as such means nothing and I am sure 
you agree that your readers would have no interest in it. More than that: I am 
sure you agree that drawing up a list of to-do’s and not-to-do’s would not be a 
good way to honor the “philosophy” of Topoi. 
To put it differently, it seems to me that the question to answer philoso-
phically is not: What is to be done? but rather: What can be done? And that’s 
the sort of question that all of us address every day as we try to pursue our 
profession. I wish I could say what that involves. But as far as I am con-
cerned, Ermanno, I am afraid that’s one of those things that I can only hope to 
be able to show, and only very partly so.  
With renewed apologies, and many thanks again for your understanding, 
 
Achille 
